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INTRODUCTION 
 
“[C]hildren are different.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481, 132 
S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 
Wn.2d 1, 8, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).   
Miller's holding rests on two prongs: (1) youth are generally “less 
culpable at the time of their crimes and culpability is of primary relevance 
in sentencing,” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22 (citing Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2464) (emphasis in Houston-Sconiers); and (2) children have greater 
prospects for reform. Id.   
Miller’s substantive rule of constitutional law applies retroactively.  
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).   
Procedural compliance with the substantive constitutional rule must 
encompass both of Miller’s prongs and include consideration of the 
youth’s diminished culpability at the time of crime commission, as well as 
the possibility that the youth will mature and become rehabilitated.  
The Washington State Legislature addressed both factors in the statute 
mandating the resentencing of children convicted of aggravated murder 
(RCW 10.95.030; .035), including those whose sentences had long been 
final.  In re McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582, 590, 334 P.3d 548 (2014) 
(“The Miller fix remedies the unlawfulness of the petitioners' sentences by 
providing they must be resentenced in a manner that does not violate the 
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Eighth Amendment, consistent with Miller.”).   
But, for individuals convicted of less serious crimes, including those 
like Scott serving life-equivalent sentences, the Legislature did not provide 
for resentencing.  Instead, the Legislature authorized only the possibility 
of parole in some instances, but not others.  But the parole decision is 
concerned with the prospect of future behavior, not culpability for the 
crime.  As a result, RCW 9.94A.730 only provides a partial fix in light of 
the two requirements of Miller.    
Moreover, under longstanding Washington precedent, the possibility 
of release by parole cannot cure an unconstitutional sentence.  The 
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing, where Scott’s 
culpability at the time of the crime can be considered.    
ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
1. Whether the parole provision of RCW 9.94A.730, which was 
enacted to provide a remedy for any sentence imposed on a juvenile in 
violation of Miller, and which does not include consideration of 
diminished culpability due to youth, provides an inadequate remedy to an 
offender who received a 900-month exceptional sentence on a murder 
conviction such that Miller is a “material” change in the law, as 
recognized in Montgomery, that exempts the offender’s personal restraint 
petition from the one-year time limit on collateral relief pursuant to RCW 
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10.73.100(6).  
2. Whether existing precedent requires the Court to disregard the 
possibility of parole in evaluating the constitutionality of a de facto life 
sentence.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
In 1990, Jai’mar Scott received a 900-month (75-year) exceptional 
sentence for a murder committed when he was 17-years old. At 
sentencing, Scott's offender score was 0. His standard sentencing range 
was 240 to 320 months. The sentencing court did not make a finding of 
irreparable corruption or anything resembling such a finding. 
On direct appeal, Scott asserted that the sentencing court erroneously 
failed to consider the fact that he was a child, not an adult, when imposing 
its sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument as bordering on 
the “absurd.” State v. Scott, 72 Wn. App. 207, 218, 866 P.2d 1258 (1993). 
In 2016, Scott returned to King County Superior Court and 
successfully moved that court to vacate his sentence and to conduct a new 
sentencing hearing. The trial court agreed, reasoning: “An offender's age 
must be taken into consideration by the Court in imposing a sentence.” 
The court continued: 
Mr. Scott was not sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole, but was sentenced to 900 months. In the case of State v. 
Ronquillo, 190 Wn. App. 765 (2015), the Court of Appeals held 
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that a sentencing court must consider the attributes of youth when 
imposing a "life equivalent" sentence. In that case, 52.5 years was 
determined to be a "life equivalent" sentence. Surely then, 900 
months or 75 years is also a "life equivalent" sentence. 
 
The State appealed. 
The Court of Appeals agreed that the sentence imposed was 
unconstitutional, but nevertheless reversed the trial court, holding that the 
statutory possibility of parole eliminated any Eighth Amendment 
violation.  The Court of Appeals held that the “constitutional violation 
identified in the Miller line of cases is the failure to allow a juvenile 
offender the opportunity for release when his or her crime was the result 
of youthful traits,” rejecting Scott’s argument that Miller also requires an 
“individualized determination” of how the “offender's youth” decreases 
his culpability for the crime.  State v. Scott, 196 Wn. App. 961, 971-72, 
385 P.3d 783 (2016). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court’s Own Precedent Establishes that the Constitutionality 
of a Sentence Cannot Turn on the Possibility of Release by Parole. 
 
The Court of Appeals erred below by finding that Mr. Scott’s 
unconstitutional sentence was cured by the possibility of parole, 
effectively overturning sub silentio this Court’s holding in State v. Fain, 
94 Wn.2d 387, 395, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). Because Fain controls, Scott’s 
de facto life sentence must be assessed “according to its literal meaning,” 
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without consideration of the possibility for release by parole. Id.   
In Fain, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for 
the theft of approximately $400.  The minimum term that Fain could serve 
was 10 years.  This Court held that the possibility of parole did not cure 
the constitutional sentencing error.  This Court stated:  
Finally, our cases and the foregoing statutory scheme reveal that 
Fain's chances of receiving parole have little to do with the crimes 
for which he was sentenced. Rather, his chances depend on his 
subsequent behavior in prison.  
 
Id.  at 395.  This Court continued:  
Under these circumstances, and because Fain's chances for 
executive grace are not legally enforceable, we feel compelled to 
view Fain's sentence according to its literal meaning: a life 
sentence. 
 
Id.  
Likewise, the possibility of parole under RCW 9.94A.730, which is 
legally indistinguishable from the parole option in Fain, does not cure Mr. 
Scott’s unconstitutional sentence.  
This Court should not overrule Fain. Overruling prior precedent 
should not be taken lightly. Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 831, 935 P.2d 
588 (1997).  This Court requires a clear showing that an established rule is 
incorrect and harmful before it may be overruled. Lunsford v. Saberhagen 
Holdings, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 264, 280, 208 P.3d 1092 (2009); In re Stranger 
Creek & Tributaries in Stevens Cty., 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 
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(1970) (“[Stare decisis] requires a clear showing that an established rule is 
incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.”). No such showing can be 
made with respect to the Fain rule.   
The lower court’s decision conflicts with Fain regarding how to 
evaluate the constitutionality of life sentences. Compare Scott, 196 Wn. 
App. at 971-72 (possibility of release by parole cures an otherwise 
unconstitutional sentence) with Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 395 (constitutionality of 
sentence turns on “its literal meaning” without consideration of possibility 
of release by parole). This Court should apply Fain and reverse the lower 
court.   
To determine whether Mr. Scott’s de facto life sentence is 
constitutional, it should be examined on its face, without consideration 
that parole may be granted before expiration of the maximum term. Fain, 
94 Wn.2d at 393-95 (because “‘parole is simply an act of executive 
grace’” and prisoners have no right to parole, it is not equivalent to a 
shorter sentence and should not be viewed as such) (quoting Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293, 100 S. Ct. 113, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980)). 
Courts have upheld parole’s status as an uncertain privilege, rather than a 
right, over several decades. See In re Dyer, 175 Wn.2d 186, 196–97, 283 
P.3d 1103 (2012) (inmates have no right to parole; parole rests exclusively 
with the discretion of the ISRB); In re Ayers, 105 Wn.2d 161, 164, 713 
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P.2d 88 (1986) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted 
person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 
sentence.”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979)); January 
v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 774, 453 P.2d 876 (1969) (inmates have no right 
to parole; parole is a “privilege conferred as an act of grace by the state 
through its own administrative agency.”). There is nothing in RCW 
9.94A.730 that merits a different rule.    
II. Miller Requires Individualized Consideration of Youth. 
 
“(C)hildren are different from adults.”   
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 18. 
Before imposing “the harshest penalties” on juveniles, a court must 
provide individualized consideration of the juvenile, including the 
influence of age on the juvenile’s culpability and prospects for 
rehabilitation. Id. Individualized consideration of a juvenile’s age is 
required because, if “youth (and all that accompanies it) [is] irrelevant to 
that harsh sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The risk of 
disproportionality flows from the inherently mitigated culpability of 
juvenile offenders and the uniquely long incarceration that follows from 
sentencing a juvenile to death in prison. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
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70, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). The Court explained that 
“youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most serious 
punishments,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, and that “the distinctive 
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,” id. at 2465; see also id. at 2464-
66, 2468-71. 
This Court recently applied the Miller rule in Houston-Sconiers.  This 
Court held, in accordance with Miller, that sentencing courts must have 
complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with 
the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice 
system. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21.  That “discretion to consider 
the mitigating qualities of youth” must exist and be exercised at the time 
of sentencing itself, regardless of what opportunities for discretionary 
release may occur down the line. Id. at 20 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2468-72 (listing reasons why certain mitigating factors had to be 
considered at the time of child's initial sentencing)); Graham, 560 U.S. at 
69-70 (Eighth Amendment bars imposition of life without parole sentence 
on juvenile non-homicide offender, despite the fact that Graham might be 
eligible for executive clemency).  
No court has given individualized consideration of the required Miller 
factors to Mr. Scott.  
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A. Scott Is Entitled to the Full Protection of the Constitution. 
 
Of the two procedural remedies available to juvenile offenders in 
Washington, parole under RCW 9.94A.730 and re-sentencing, parole may 
satisfy Miller’s requirement that a sentencing scheme account for the 
possibility of maturation and rehabilitation, but (unless the parole criteria 
are amended) re-sentencing is necessary to satisfy Miller’s requirement 
that youth be considered in determining culpability under Washington’s 
current framework. Under the current statutory scheme, a juvenile 
offender’s youth and its relationship to culpability are considered only at a 
sentencing hearing, and not during the parole process. Compare RCW 
10.95.030(3)(b) (sentencing court must consider “mitigating factors that 
account for the diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)”) with RCW 9.94A.730(3) (no reference 
to youth or Miller in its list of considerations for release by parole).  
The lower court concluded that the applicable parole provision 
satisfied the requirements of Miller.  The lower court was wrong. Because 
the Washington parole system addresses only the second prong of what 
Miller holds makes children different, it fails to adequately implement the 
substantive constitutional rule. The States are “laboratories for 
experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the 
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Constitution protects.”  Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001, 
188 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2014).   
Substantive constitutional rules can be implemented in a variety of 
procedural ways.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 
2250, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-
17, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986).  Ford acknowledged, “we 
leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the 
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id.   
The applicable procedural rule must implement the full constitutional 
rule.  Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239, 245, 31 S. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 
191 (1911), establishes that if a State's procedures transgress a substantive 
constitutional right “in their natural operation,” those procedures are 
unconstitutional.  In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 2 L. 
Ed. 2d 1460 (1958), the United States Supreme Court again imposed 
express constitutional limits on state procedural rules implicating federal 
constitutional rights in the specific context of confronting a state law 
placing the burden of proof on an individual.  Under these cases, a State 
cannot create procedures that effectively eviscerate a substantive 
constitutional right, but rather “must provide procedures which are 
adequate to safeguard against infringement of [the] constitutionally 
protected right [ ].” Id. at 521. 
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Applying Miller retroactively does not necessarily “require States to 
relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile 
offender received mandatory life without parole.” Montgomery, 136 Sup. 
Ct. at 736. While a Miller violation may be remedied “by permitting 
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by 
resentencing them,” id., that is true only when the parole process includes 
consideration of how youth diminishes responsibility.   
The lower court in this case construed the “children are different” rule 
too narrowly when it stated the “constitutional violation identified in 
the Miller line of cases is the failure to allow a juvenile offender the 
opportunity for release when his or her crime was the result of youthful 
traits.”  Scott, 196 Wn. App. at 971. The constitutional violation identified 
in Miller, applied retroactively in Montgomery and explained by this Court 
in Houston-Sconiers, was the failure to consider the mitigating qualities of 
youth at the time of the crime and in the future.  In fact, this Court 
recognized “Miller is mainly concerned with what must happen at 
sentencing because Miller's holding rests on the insight that youth are 
generally less culpable at the time of their crimes and culpability is of 
primary relevance in sentencing.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22 
(emphasis in original).   
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The part of the Miller fix statute applicable to this case, RCW 
9.94A.730, prioritizes public safety considerations and likelihood of 
recidivism. It makes no allowance for consideration of any of the 
mitigating factors of youth that Miller requires at the time of sentencing. 
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22. 
While the Washington Legislature conceptually could have adopted a 
parole system that considers both prongs of Miller, it did not do so.  
Instead, the legislature created a statute that determines release based on 
rehabilitation.  As a result, a child who received a sentence where the 
mitigating qualities of his youth at the time of the crime was not 
considered by the sentencing court cannot compel the parole board to 
consider that evidence at a hearing to determine whether he will be 
released.  There is no language in RCW 9.94A.730 directing the ISRB to 
consider a defendant’s diminished culpability due to his youth at a parole 
hearing.   
As a result, the parole statute implements, at most, only half of the 
constitutional requirement.  Criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants' youthfulness fully into account are flawed. Scott is entitled to 
the full protection of the Constitution.  Scott is entitled to a hearing in 
which the decision-maker has the “complete discretion to consider 
mitigating circumstances associated with” his youth. Houston-Sconiers, 
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188 Wn.2d at 21.  The only forum in Washington where that can currently 
take place is at a resentencing hearing.   
B. Montgomery Does Not Hold Otherwise.   
While Montgomery noted that  “[a] State may remedy 
a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be 
considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them,” 136 S. Ct. at 
736, the Court’s comment is classic dictum. Cf. City of Seattle v. Holifield, 
170 Wn.2d 230, 244 n.13, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (court's comments in an 
opinion that are immaterial to the outcome are dicta); State v. Halgren, 
137 Wn.2d 340, 346 n.3, 971 P.2d 512 (1999) (same). While dicta “may 
be followed if sufficiently persuasive,” Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 
295 U.S. 602, 627, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935), the dictum in 
Montgomery is not.  
First, the Court in Montgomery cited to the Wyoming statute regarding 
parole for juveniles in support of this comment.  However, Wyoming 
provides more than the possibility of parole.  The Wyoming statute 
expressly provides for commutation by the Governor of the juvenile’s 
sentence. And, if the Governor does not commute to a lesser sentence, the 
statute makes the juvenile parole eligible after serving a minimum of 25 
years, i.e., the same minimum term adopted for juveniles under 16 
convicted of aggravated murder in Washington. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–
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10–301(c) (2013). 
Further, whether the possibility of release by parole might satisfy the 
constitutional requirements of Miller was not essential to the outcome 
regarding retroactivity. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725 (certified 
question was “whether [Miller’s] holding is retroactive to juvenile 
offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when [it] was 
decided”).  
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court’s reference to 
parole simply acknowledges that a state could fashion a parole system in a 
manner consistent with both Miller prongs. But the permissive language 
does not and could not account for variances in a particular state as to 
whether the possibility of parole cures an unconstitutional sentence.  
When faced with this issue, courts in other states have determined that 
the mere fact that a juvenile offender may be eligible for parole does not 
by itself satisfy Graham and Miller. Across the board, where courts have 
considered the adequacy of parole to cure an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence, they have found the consideration of youth at some stage of the 
process to be paramount. See Md. Restorative Justice Initiative v. Hogan, 
Civil Action No. ELH-16-1021, 2017 WL 467731, at *24–27 (D. Md. 
Feb. 3, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss and permitting plaintiffs to 
pursue claim that Maryland’s system of parole did not provide a 
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meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based in part on the failure 
of the parole system to account for youth); Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400-01, 140 A.D.3d 34 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (inmate entitled to new parole release hearing at 
which his youth would be considered after parole board failed to consider 
the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics); Atwell v. 
Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016) (re-sentencing required for 
juvenile homicide offender because existing statutory parole system failed 
to consider youth as required by Miller); Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 
3d 933, 945 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that 
plaintiff was entitled to discovery and full consideration of his claim that 
Iowa’s system of parole did not provide him with a meaningful 
opportunity for release where decision was based solely on severity of the 
crime without consideration of youth, rehabilitation, or maturity); Hayden 
v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1010–11 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (finding that 
North Carolina’s system of parole did not provide plaintiff a meaningful 
opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth Amendment where youth 
not considered as part of parole process); Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 
505–06 (6th Cir. 2014) (remanding for consideration as to whether 
Michigan’s system of parole and procedures for parole provide a 
meaningful, realistic opportunity for release because youth was not 
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considered at district court level). Cf. Connecticut v. Williams-Bey, 167 
Conn. App. 744, 747, 144 A.3d 467 (2016) (denying resentencing and 
holding that parole hearing where mitigating factors of youth must be 
considered is sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements); Arizona v. 
Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, 576–77, 334 P.3d 754 (2014) (holding resentencing 
not required under Miller because legislature provided for possibility of 
release by parole and youth of the defendant was considered as a 
mitigating factor at time of sentencing).  
These cases make clear that the mere existence of a system of parole is 
insufficient to satisfy Graham and Miller, notwithstanding Montgomery’s 
dictum. In Mr. Scott’s case, the court below, in error, relied solely upon 
the Miller fix statute without considering whether Washington’s system of 
parole actually satisfies Graham and Miller. 
In addition to failing to require consideration of the qualities of youth 
that diminish culpability, additional factors support the conclusion that 
Washington’s parole system does not adequately ensure compliance with 
the “children are different” doctrine.  
Parole practices do not provide the same protections afforded at re-
sentencing. See, e.g., CrR 3.1(b)(2) (lawyer shall be provided at every 
stage of the proceedings, including sentencing); CrR 7.1(c)–(d) (new 
evidence and other reports may be furnished); and CrR 7.2 (appealability 
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of sentence). At a parole proceeding in Washington, there is only a limited 
right to counsel1 and limited opportunity to provide evidence,2 and the 
denial of parole is only reviewable to the extent that unlawful restraint can 
be demonstrated.3 Importantly, the Washington Administrative Code 
contains no specific parole considerations for juveniles, who are therefore 
treated the same as adult offenders for purposes of procedural and 
substantive standards for release. See WAC 381-10-030; WAC 381-40-
030. Although RCW 9.94A.730(3) includes a presumption of release for 
petitioning juveniles, it also vests the board with considerable 
discretionary authority and attaches strict conditions upon release. 
This discretion rests in the hands of only a few people who are guided 
by standards that lack adequate procedural protections. See RCW 
9.94.003(1) (Board consists of chair and four members); RCW 9.95.100 
(prisoner not to be released unless in the Board’s opinion his or her 
                                                        
1
 See Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 783, 658 P.2d 663 (1983) (holding that the Board 
is not constitutionally required to provide counsel for indigents at State expense); WAC 
381-60-070 (inmate has right to have attorney present, but at her own expense “since the 
board has no funds to pay for attorneys”); ISRB Frequently Asked Questions, Wash. State 
Dep’t of Corr., http://doc.wa.gov/corrections/isrb/faq.htm#attorney (last visited June 27, 
2017) (juvenile inmates “not represented by an attorney during the release eligibility 
process, unless Board determines that a cognitive or mental health issue prohibits them 
from fully participating in the hearing”). 
2
 See WAC 381-60-080 (witnesses may be called at parolee’s expense); WAC 381-60-
090 (Board hearing restrictions); WAC 381-60-150 (admissibility of evidence). 
3
 Dyer, 164 Wn.2d at 285 (must show unlawful restraint to succeed on a PRP challenge 
of an ISRB decision). 
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rehabilitation has been complete and is a fit subject for release); WAC 
381-40-100 (conditioning eligibility on the presentation of a parole plan 
including means of support and suitable residence). Under the Miller fix 
statute, “[t]he board shall order the person released …, unless the board 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that, …, it is more likely 
than not that the person will commit new criminal law violations if 
released.” RCW 9.94A.730(3). However, the process is still far too 
subjective given this vague and speculative standard and the small number 
of people making the determination. Moreover, an inmate has limited 
ability to appeal an ISRB decision. Decisions made by the ISRB are only 
reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Dyer, 164 Wn.2d at 286 
(“We must find the ISRB acted willfully and unreasonably to support a 
determination that the parolability decision is arbitrary and capricious.”). 
Further, if a prisoner is denied parole, she may not be able to petition 
again for five years. RCW 9.94A.730(6).  
This inherent subjectivity is further illustrated by how parole, once 
granted, can be revoked at almost any time. See January, 75 Wn.2d at 775 
(the Board may revise or modify the conditions of parole or suspend 
parole based on a report by the parole officer or upon its own discretion); 
see also RCW 9.95.425 (allowing for arrest and detention where board has 
“reason to believe” parolee has violated law or terms of release). If parole 
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is revoked, discretion lies with the ISRB as to whether it will be reinstated. 
RCW 9.95.440. This aggregate discretion and subjectivity create serious 
doubts as to whether the Washington system of parole for juveniles 
provides a meaningful opportunity for release.  
Parole also fails to provide a truly meaningful opportunity for release 
because when the state imposes a life-equivalent sentence, it subjects the 
incarcerated juvenile to an environment that frustrates personal 
development, yet relies heavily on reformability in determining whether 
parole is warranted. See Sally T. Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release 
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful 
Opportunity for Release, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 31–34 (2011). For 
individuals like Mr. Scott to mature and develop into functional members 
of society who are ready for re-integration, meaningful services 
encouraging and assessing such development must be provided. Yet the 
Washington Department of Corrections is not required to conduct an 
assessment of the offender or to identify services appropriate to prepare 
the offender for re-integration until five years prior to the expiration of 
their uniform twenty-year minimum sentence. See RCW 9.94A.730(2).  
   This high degree of uncertainty and subjectivity inherent to the parole 
process, coupled with the lack of consideration of youth, result in a 
process that fails to provide a meaningful opportunity for release as 
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required by the Eighth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the Court of 
Appeals’ decision and grant Mr. Scott a new sentencing hearing in order 
to comply with Miller and Fain.  
Dated July 5, 2017. 
/s/ Jeffrey E. Ellis 
Jeffrey E. Ellis #17139 
Attorney for Mr. Scott 
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Portland, OR 97205 
JeffreyErwinEllis@gmail.com 
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Melissa R. Lee, WSBA #38808 
Attorneys for Mr. Scott 
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